Tax policy with hyperbolic discounting by NARIS SATHAPHOLDEJA
  











A THESIS SUBMITTED 
 
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 










I am indebted to Dr. Cheoelbeom Park, who always exerts great patience with my 
‘hyperbolic’ self throughout the years, for numerous comments and suggestions. 
Without his guidance, this project would not be possible. I am also much grateful to 
Dr. Wong Wei-Kang for introducing me to this topic in his EC5212 class. Thanks 
also go to my good friends: Edwards, Kuhan, Lucraz, Nicholas, and Terrence. Again, 
without them, I would not be able to pull through my study here. Last but not least, I 
am indebted to my parents and my Thai friends at NUS, both students and lecturers 
alike, who support me in many ways during the period of my stay in Singapore. 
 This project acknowledges financial support from NUS research scholarship. 
The usual disclaimer applies. Any error in this paper should be blamed on my t-1 












Table of Content 
 
               
• Summary         4−5 
• List of Tables          6 
• List of Figures                                                                                       7 
• Chapter 1: Introduction        8−11 
• Chapter 2: Literature Reviews      12−18 
• Chapter 3: Model Setup       19−30 
• Chapter 4: Simulation Methodology and Calibration   31−34 
• Chapter 5: Fundamental Tax Reform     35−40 
• Chapter 6: Consumption-tax Scheme for Hyperbolic Individuals 41−51 
• Chapter 7: Conclusion       52−54 
• Bibliography           55 
• Appendix A: Tables       57−62 












This paper examines the properties of taxation when individuals possess hyperbolic 
discounting preferences and do not have an access to a commitment technology. 
Specifically, two issues are addressed. The first issue concerns a fundamental reform 
on a tax regime from income taxation to consumption taxation. Based on the 
simulations, this reform experiment helps determining the proper choice of tax base 
in an economy with hyperbolic discounting. The analysis is founded on a comparison 
between the pre-reform steady state and post-reform steady state, given the varying 
degree of hyperbolic discounting. The second issue deals with the use of the 
consumption-tax scheme to restrain excessive consumptions by hyperbolic 
individuals. The formal derivation of the tax structure is presented together with the 
evidence from the simulations.   
In the analysis of a tax reform, the simulations suggest that a switch towards 
consumption taxation produces positive welfare effects when individuals are subject 
to hyperbolic discounting. The extent of welfare improvement is positively correlated 
with the degree of hyperbolic discounting (represented by the inverse value of a 
hyperbolic discount factor, γ), though the magnitude is somewhat negligible; when γ  
= 1 (exponential discounting), the welfare gain is -1.83%; when γ  = 0.9, the welfare 
gain is 0.09%; when γ  = 0.8, the gain is 0.93%; and when γ  = 0.7, the gain is 1.36%. 
What accounts for these lukewarm results may be that, though the shifting towards 
consumption taxation helps deter consumptions and thus should contribute to welfare 
improvement in the hyperbolic cases, intertemporal distortions among individuals are 
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not removed given the flat-rate structure of the consumption-tax regime (i.e., every 
individual faces the identical tax rate, regardless of her generation).  
 Hyperbolic individuals lack self-control over instantaneous gratification; as 
consumers, they are susceptible to a consumption spree in their earlier lives and are 
eventually forced to ‘squeeze through’ with their limited savings when they are in 
elder generations. Given this insight, casual observation suggests that the proper 
consumption-tax structure should be of a declining pattern; i.e., discouraging the 
youths from overspending, while keeping a lenient stance towards the retirees who 
are, supposedly, short of savings. This paper formalizes this argument by deriving the 
explicit consumption-tax structure that is dependent on the hyperbolic discounting 
parameter, γ.          
 The numerical evidence is in favor of the proposed consumption-tax scheme. 
From the simulations, the implementation of the scheme induces more consumption 
smoothing among hyperbolic individuals, provided the identical set of parameter 
values. This corresponds to the improving welfare outcomes: when γ  = 0.9, the 
corresponding tax rates for youths, adults, and retirees are 10.15%, -0.87%, and -
10.78% respectively and the welfare gain is 2.3%; and when γ  = 0.8, the 
corresponding rates for youths, adults, and retirees are 30%, 4%, and -16.8% 
respectively and the welfare gain is 2.95%. The negative tax rates (i.e., a subsidy on 
consumptions) experienced in elder generations are merely a transfer of resources 
from the younger generations within the same period, since the government is 
assumed to maintain balanced budget policy and thus use revenue from consumption 
taxation to finance the subsidy. 
 6
List of Tables (Appendix A) 
 
• Table 4.1: standard parameter values      57 
• Table 4.2: benchmark steady states      58 
• Table 5.1: pre-reform benchmark steady states under income taxation  59 
• Table 5.2: effects of a tax reform towards the consumption-tax regime  60 
• Table 6.1: effects of the proposed consumption-tax scheme (γ = 0.9)  61 
















List of Figures (Appendix B) 
 
• Figure 4.1: effective discount factors for various values of  γ   63 
• Figure 4.2: benchmark consumption profile for various values of  γ  63 
• Figure 6.1: cons.-tax scheme, steady-state cons. profiles (γ  = 0.9)  64 



















Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
Recent experimental studies on time preference suggest that individuals suffer from 
an intrapersonal conflict in their intertemporal decisions.1 When tradeoffs are distant, 
individuals tend to be relatively patient (e.g., ‘I prefer two apples in 101 days, rather 
than one apple in 100 days). But when tradeoffs actually loom closer, their 
preferences backtrack, exhibiting more impatience (e.g., ‘I prefer one apple right 
now, rather than two apples tomorrow).2 This non-constant degree of time impatience 
elicits dynamic inconsistency.  
 To capture this type of dynamic inconsistency, recent papers led by Laibson 
(1996, 1997, 1998) have proposed the use of hyperbolic discount function− as 
opposed to the conventional exponential discount function. The hyperbolic structure 
of discount function implies that discount rates are higher in long-run than in short-
run, creating a conflict between current preferences and later preferences. This 
conflict causes individuals to succumb to the temptation for instantaneous 
gratification and therefore to deviate from the optimal long-run decisions that they 
initially set up (i.e., they end up choosing one apple right now, rather than two apples 
tomorrow).  
 In the context of consumption-saving decisions, hyperbolic discounting 
induces undersaving problem. With an absence of a commitment mechanism (e.g., 
highly illiquid assets or irreversible long-term saving plans), hyperbolic consumers 
                                                 
1 The issue was first examined in Thaler (1981) and later substantiated in Ainslie (1992) and 
Loewenstein and Drazen (1992). Reviews are discussed in Chapter 2.    
2 This example is from Thaler (1981). 
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will not achieve the lifetime targeted savings, since the temptation for today’s 
spending− specifically, to indulge in spontaneous utility from consumptions− 
undermines their efforts to save for their long term plans. The lack of self-control 
over instantaneous gratification implies that consumers tend to consume too much 
and save too little in their early lives and thus are unable to smooth out their 
consumptions. Generally, this pattern of behavior results in front-loaded consumption 
paths that are suboptimal relative to the paths generated by conventional consumers 
with exponential discount function.3     
Given these insights and evidence, an interesting question is whether there is a 
role for government intervention to improve upon the private outcomes of consumers. 
So far, there are only two papers that adopt a fiscal policy as a tool to resolve the 
undersaving anomaly in consumers: Laibson (1996) and Krussell et al. (2000). Both 
have implemented the tax scheme on capital income that penalizes excess 
consumptions in early lives of consumers. The tax penalty provides government with 
a device that could force consumers to commit to their long-term saving plans.  
 This paper considers the issues of tax policies in an economy where 
individuals possess hyperbolic discounting preferences. Essentially, the purpose of 
this paper is twofold. First, it determines the optimal choice of tax base in the 
presence of hyperbolic discounting. This is done by conducting the simulation 
analysis of a reform policy that shifts the tax regime from income taxation to 
consumption taxation. The welfare implications− measured by lifetime indirect utility 
of a representative agent− from the policy in the hyperbolic discounting cases are 
                                                 
3 See Laibson (1996) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) for details. 
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examined on the basis of a comparison to the exponential benchmark. Second, it 
proposes the consumption-tax scheme that addresses the undersaving problem. As 
will be shown later, the implementation of this proposed scheme will structurally 
remove intertemporal distortions posed by hyperbolic discounting, thereby leading to 
more consumption smoothing and, thus, better welfare outcomes. The derivation of 
the scheme will be accompanied by the numerical evidence from the simulations.  
 The analyses in this paper are based on the life-cycle general equilibrium 
model where individuals live for three periods. Overlapping generations of 
individuals face consumption-saving decisions in each period of their lives and do not 
face uncertainty. Individuals are also assumed to be naive in the sense that they could 
not foresee their intertemporal conflict.4 In addition, only one type of assets is 
available in the market− an interest-bearing deposit that needs to be redeemed after 
one period. This, therefore, rules out the possibility of accessing to any commitment 
device. The government sector maintains the balanced budget by levying taxes on 
income to finance the exogenous public spending.  
 This paper is divided into seven chapters, including this introduction. Chapter 
2 provides a primer on hyperbolic discounting and reviews the related literature 
regarding to the issue of taxation. Chapter 3 lays out the formal model and describes 
the decision process of consumers with hyperbolic discounting preferences. In line 
with the previous chapter, Chapter 4 presents the model calibration and highlights 
some important characteristics of the steady states under hyperbolic discounting, as 
                                                 
4 The alternative is to assume that individuals are sophisticated. The sophisticated individuals are 
capable of foreseeing that they will later want to deviate from the current plan, and therefore seek to 
limit their ‘later’ actions by committing themselves to more illiquid assets. However, since a 
commitment device is not allowed for in this study, this assumption is trivial.    
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compared to the benchmarks where the preferences are of the conventional 
exponential form. Chapter 5 implements the reform policy that switches from income 
taxes to consumption taxes (both types of taxes are flat and proportional) and 
analyzes its welfare effect, given the varying degree of hyperbolic discounting in 
preferences of individuals. Chapter 6 presents the consumption-tax scheme which 



















Chapter 2: Literature Reviews 
 
 
The related literature discussed in this chapter can be divided into two sections. The 
first section provides a brief introduction to hyperbolic discounting and its rationale. 
The second section summarizes the previous works related to the implications of tax 
policies within the life-cycle framework and points out how this study places itself 
among the literature. 
 
2.1) Hyperbolic Discounting         
Dynamic consistency is one of the central assumptions in mainstream economic 
models including the workhorses such as the infinite-horizon model and the 
overlapping-generations model. This assumption stylizes the convention that 
individuals have a constant time-discount rate. Therefore, given dynamically 
consistent preferences, the first-order conditions implies that, for any arbitrary t, the 
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between their consumptions at time t + 1 and 
time t is always constant equal to the discount factor (in a strict sense, assume that 
interest rate does not exist).5   
 However, many studies in both psychology and, more recently, experimental 
economics have suggested that individuals exhibit patterns of ‘preference reversals’ 
over time and consequently fail to commit to their pre-planned sequence of choices 
                                                 
5 Dynamic consistency implies that the discount function assumes the exponential form. Given the 
exponential discount function {1, β, β2, ...}, the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution is therefore 
constant equal to β. For example, from the perspective of time 0, the MRS of consumptions between 
time 10 and time 11 is (β11/β10) = β. Consistently, from the perspective of time 10, the MRS between 
time 10 and time 11 is also (β/1) = β.  
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(Thaler, 1981; Ainslie, 1992; Loewenstein and Drazen, 1992).6 Essentially, they 
observed that individuals are more impatient when they make short-run tradeoffs than 
when they make long-run tradeoffs. This results in a conflict between today’s 
preferences and the preferences that will be adopted in the future, thereby inducing 
individuals to deviate from the decided initial plans. Angeletos et al. (2001) provided 
a lucid example on this point: 
 
 “Our preferences for the long run tend to conflict with our short-run behavior. 
When planning for the long run, we intend to meet our deadlines, exercise 
regularly, and eat healthfully. But in the short-run, we have little interest in 
revising manuscripts, jogging on the StairMaster, and skipping the chocolate 
soufflé a la mode. Delay of gratification is a nice long-term goal, but instant 
gratification is disconcertingly tempting."   
 
These findings argue against the use of the dynamic consistency assumption in the 
neoclassical framework and its implication on the constancy of the MRS. They 
suggest that a fundamental change should be made on the way individuals discount 
the future when making decisions over their intertemporal choices.    
To capture this behavioral anomaly, several studies have adopted the 
hyperbolic discount function. This form of discount function induces dynamic 
inconsistency.7 Unlike the exponential discount function, the convexity of hyperbolic 
discount functions implies the monotonically decreasing discount factor at an 
increasing rate and, as a result, the falling MRS over time horizon.  
                                                 
6 For a comprehensive review, see Angeletos et al. (2001).  
7 Dynamic inconsistency refers to preferences that conflict the individuals’ own preferences at a later 
date.   
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This strand of literature was led by Strotz (1956) who first pointed out that the 
neoclassical discounted utility framework should incorporate the fact that discount 
rates are higher in the short run than in the long run. This work presented a simplistic 
non-constant discounted utility version of a neoclassical model. Since then, a few 
studies in psychology began to formalize the use of hyperbolic discount functions like 
1/τ and 1/(1 + ατ), with α > 0  (Ainslie, 1992), though mainly motivated by 
experiments and initially unintended to be applied in economic models. Building on 
these works, Loewenstein and Drazen (1992) later generalized the form of hyperbolic 
discount function which weighs realizations τ periods away with the factor 
1/(1 + ατ)−γ/α  with α, γ > 0. Competing with other functional forms, this formation of 
discount function is so far proven to be the most comprehensive form to fit the 
experimental evidences.   
Recently, a series of papers by Laibson (1996, 1997, 1998) has put the issue 
of hyperbolic discounting back into limelight. Being much simplified while 
maintaining at large the qualitative property of the hyperbolic discount function, these 
studies proposed a more accessible discrete-time discount function, 
{1, γβ, γβ2, γβ3, ...} with 0 < γ < 1, which Phelps and Pollak (1968) had used to model 
time preferences with bequest motif.  
Laibson (1996) termed this discount function “quasi-hyperbolic” to emphasize 
a qualitative resemblance to the original hyperbolic discount function: a faster rate of 
decline in the short run than in the long run. Several studies also have adopted this 
form of discount function under different aliases. Akerlof (1991) used a similar 
discount function to represent the “salience cost” of the present. O’Donoghue and 
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Rabin (1999) termed the discount function “present biased”. Krussell and Smith 
(2000) termed the discount function “quasi-geometric”.  
 The quasi-hyperbolic preferences induce dynamic inconsistency. This can be 
implied from the decreasing MRS and the resulting intertemporal conflict. That is, 
from the perspective of time 0, the MRS of consumption between time 10 and time 11 
is (γβ11)/(γβ10) = β, whereas from perspective of time 10, the MRS between time 10 
and time 11 is (γβ/1) = γβ. It can be seen that the inconsistency in the MRS stems 
from the fact that it is time-dependent. Besides, since γ < 1, individuals with the 
quasi-hyperbolic discount function exhibit an intrapersonal conflict over time 
preferences; while being patient in the long run (at time 0, the discount factor 
between time 10 and time 11 is β), they are impatient in the short run (at time 10, the 
discount factor between time 10 and time 11 is γβ).            
 The applications of hyperbolic discount functions mainly focus on the issue of 
behavioral anomaly in economic choices. Along this line of literature, Akerlof (1991) 
presented a salience-cost model to explain procrastination of a task which requires 
action at a single point in time. The caveat of this early work is that it hinges on the 
assumption that the individuals are naive in the sense that they are unaware of their 
intertemporal self-conflict. The later work on procrastination by O’Donoghue and 
Rabin (1999) improved upon this point by introducing the ‘sophisticated’ individuals 
who could foresee their conflict and thus wish to restrain themselves by some 
commitment mechanism (e.g, choices that do not allow them to deviate later such as 
illiquid assets). Laibson (1996, 1997) and Krussell and Smith (2000) focused on the 
implications of self-control problem and ‘undersaving’ inflicted by the quasi-
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hyperbolic discounting over life-cycle savings decisions of ‘sophisticated’ consumers. 
Diamond and Koszegi (2002) analyzed ‘sophisticated’ agents’ decisions over 
retirement timing.     
 This study analyzes the quasi-hyperbolic discounting life-cycle model where 
individuals, who make consumption-saving choices, are assumed to be naive in 
realizing their dynamic inconsistency problem.8 The nature of hyperbolic discounting 
implies that individuals are lured by instant gratification (utility from current 
consumptions) to sacrifice their long term plans (targeted savings). Basically, this 
self-control problem generates front-loaded consumption paths which are sub-
optimal, implying that individuals fail to save up to the level they initially intend.        
 Lastly, to facilitate the exposition, note that the quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
will be referred throughout this study simply as ‘hyperbolic discounting’ otherwise 
the distinction shall be made where necessary in the context. Moreover, it is agreeable 
to term individuals with the hyperbolic discount function simply as ‘hyperbolic 
individuals’. 
 
2.2) Tax Policies in Life-Cycle Model with Hyperbolic Consumers    
The application of hyperbolic discounting on fiscal policy issues has been in a 
nascent stage of development. So far, there are only a few studies that adopt 
hyperbolic discounting in a life-cycle model to study the implications of taxation 
policies. In line with the scope of this study, the related literature can be classified 
                                                 
8 However, since any form of commitment mechanism is not allowed in this study, the naive 
assumption becomes trivial, for it does not produce different results from the sophisticated case. 
 17
into two issues as follows: 1) implications from a tax reform and 2) whether tax 
policies can be used to mitigate the ‘undersaving’ problem of hyperbolic consumers.  
First, the issue of tax reform was discussed in Petersen (2004) based on a 
general equilibrium overlapping-generations model with quasi-hyperbolic consumers. 
The paper provided a comparison of the simulation results from some reform policies 
between two cases: exponential discounting and quasi-hyperbolic discounting. For 
both cases, switching a regime from income taxes to consumption taxes brings about 
both higher welfare and higher long-run capital stock formation.9 Besides, it has been 
found that a reform toward the consumption tax regime particularly leads to welfare 
improvement in the quasi-hyperbolic case; i.e., the higher degree of ‘hyperbolic’, the 
better the welfare improvement becomes. The intuition is that since quasi-hyperbolic 
consumers tend to spend too much and save too little, the consumption tax regime, as 
opposed to the income tax regime, partially discourages consumers from myopically 
indulging their present gratification. However, though this study first proposed the 
use consumption taxes on quasi-hyperbolic consumers, it merely applied a simplistic 
flat-rate tax structure across the population, providing no direct mechanism on how to 
correct the hyperbolic discounting problem.                         
 Second, dealing more rigorously with the ‘undersaving’ issue of hyperbolic 
consumers, Laibson (1996) proposed the implementation of a centrally planned 
saving policy which penalizes excess consumption of the early generations (i.e., 
youths) by levying capital income taxes. This penalty acts as an incentive mechanism 
for individuals to commit themselves to their optimal saving paths. Based on a life-
cycle economy with exogenous stochastic income processes, this early work assumed 
                                                 
9 Note that welfare is measured in terms of the realized lifetime utility of consumers.  
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that a central planner is in the form of the benevolent government who wants to 
maximize consumers’ welfare. Later, Krussell et al. (2000) extended the analysis by 
endogenizing income processes and assuming that the government also suffers from 
the dynamic inconsistent problem and thus could not commit to the future policy. In 
opposition to the previous study, it argued that the results may vary depending on the 
parameter values. For some parameter values, the implementation of capital income 
taxes can be welfare-improving, while, for other parameter values, the optimal 
solution is laissez-faire, suggesting no government intervention.             
 Briefly, this study begins by considering the issue of the tax reform. It 
improves upon the reform experiments exercised in Petersen (2004) by assuming that, 
instead of being held constant, government spending is proportional to the size of an 
economy. However, note that the assumption of the flat-rate tax structure is still 
maintained. 
Apart from the simplistic tax reform, this study proposes the specific structure 
of consumption taxation that would suppress the intertemporal distortion posed by 
hyperbolic discounting. To author’s knowledge, this study is the first to formalize the 
consumption-tax scheme as a correction mechanism to deal with the hyperbolic 
discounting preferences. The formal derivation of the tax structure together with some 






Chapter 3: Model Setup 
 
 
This chapter describes the general setting of the model and its solution strategy.  The 
model is kept, where pertinent, parsimonious as much as possible to compromise with 
the computation burden.10 Basically, the model depicts a closed economy which 
consists of three sectors: a household sector, a production sector, and a government 
sector. For each sector, one can derive a system of equations relating endogenous 
variables (e.g., consumption, capital stock, etc.) to predetermined variables and taste 
and technological parameters. By simultaneously solving the equations, the 
equilibrium solution paths of the economy are obtained.  
 
3.1) Household Behavior       
A household sector is assumed to have an overlapping-generations structure. 
Specifically, individuals are homogenous within generations and live for three 
periods of life. One period thus represents approximately 20 years. At any given 
period, the population is composed of youths, adults, and retirees. Each period, one 
generation dies and another is born to takes its place. Note that the model is not 
allowed for altruistic motive and explicit family structure (e.g., children), thereby 
ruling out possibilities of bequests and inheritances. In addition, this study assumes 
                                                 
10 The time-inconsistency nature of quasi-hyperbolic discounting induces higher computational burden. 
Instead of strictly adhering to their first-period decision as conventional forward-looking agents do, the 
agents now re-optimize consumption choices in every period along their lifetime. For instance, given 
55-period lived agents with no bequest or altruistic motive, they will optimize their choices for 54 
times throughout lifetime. Based on author’s computation on MATLAB, to solve for 10-period 
consumer problem with quasi-hyperbolic discounting, it takes at least an hour on Pentium 4 system. 
For more details, Petersen (2004) applies quasi-hyperbolic discounting to 55-period model based on 
Auerbach & Kotlikoff (1987).   
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zero rate of population growth. Thus, each generation shares the same member size 
(Nt = N0). This implies that the total number of population at any period is 3N0.  
 
A. Preferences 
As discussed in the previous chapter, this study posits that individuals suffer from the 
dynamic-inconsistency problem a la Laibson (1996, 1997, 1998). That is, individuals 
differ from conventional consumers in neoclassical literature by two folds: 1) their 
discount function is of the quasi-hyperbolic form instead of normal exponent, and 2) 
individuals re-optimize their consumption-saving choices period-wise.11  
Since all individuals in a generational cohort are identical, the decision 
problem reduces to that of a representative agent. Essentially, the representative 
individual periodically decides on a consumption-saving choice given quasi-
hyperbolic discounted intertemporal utility function and lifetime budget constraint. 
Utility function is assumed to be additively separable form: 
 
Ut = u Hc1 tL + gbu Hc2 t+1L + gb2 u Hc3 t+2L    (3.1) 
  
where c1t, c2t+1, and c3t+2 represent consumption of youth, adult, and retiree 
respectively, β  is the standard discount factor, and γ is the quasi-hyperbolic discount 
factor. Essentially, the degree of dynamic inconsistency (or namely the ‘degree of 
hyperbolic discounting’) in the preference (3.1) depends on the size of γ. In other 
                                                 
11 In this study, individuals are assumed to be ‘naif’ in realizing their intertemporal self 
conflict; i.e. they make current choices under the false optimism that their later selves will 
carry out the plan of current selves. Thus, the current selves choose a sequence of choices that 
maximizes the preferences of the current selves without forseeing the arising conflict. 
However, since any commitment mechanism is not allowed for in the model, this assumption 
is trivial.       
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words, the smaller is γ, the more of their lifetime resources people will myopically 
spend early in their lives and the less they will save due to the lack of self-control 
(i.e., they would become more and more inconsistent to their initial plan). However, 
when γ = 1, the preference reduces to the conventional dynamically-consistent case 
where discounting follows an exponential pattern.    
It is also assumed here that the felicity function u(•) takes the form of constant 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (CES): 
 
 
u H•L = Hci1-1ês - 1L1 - 1 ê s       (3.2) 
 
where σ  denotes elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The elasticity of substitution 
determines the percentage change in the ratio of any two periods’ consumption with 
respect to a percentage change in the relative price of consumption in the two periods. 
Its size represents the responsiveness of individuals to changes in the incentive to 
save (i.e., interest rate).    
 
B. Household’s Budget Constraint   
At each period, individuals supply labor inelastically and earn wage income which 
will be allocated to their current consumptions and savings. It is assumed that labors 
are paid by their efficiency and those from different generations share different 
efficiency profile. Moreover, individuals are subject to either consumption taxes or 
income taxes (including both wage and capital income). Mainly, in the simulation 
scenarios, income tax is the default unless otherwise stated. However, for the sake of 
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exposition, both kinds of taxes are explicitly shown in the budget constraint. Later 
chapters will specifically discuss the varied implementation of tax policies in details. 
Generation-wise budget constraints are following: 
 H1 - twtL e1 wt = H1 + tc1 tL c1 t + s1 t      (3.3.1) 
 H1 - twt+1L e2 wt+1 + H1 + H1 - twt+1L rt+1L s1 t = H1 + tc2 t+1L c2 t+1 + s2 t+1  (3.3.2) 
 H1 - twt+2L e3 wt+2 + H1 + H1 - twt+2L rt+2L s2 t+1 = H1 + tc3 t+2L c3 t+2  (3.3.3) 
 
 
where s1t is saving of a youth in period t; s2t+1 is saving of an adult in period t+1; τwt 
denotes the income tax; τc1t, τc2t, and τc3t represent the consumption taxes in period t 
imposed on the youths, the adults, and the retirees, respectively; and e1 represents 
work efficiency of the youth cohort; e2 for the adult cohort; and, e3 for the retiree 
cohort.12 From the last period budget constraint (3.3.3), it can be seen the retirees 
must consume away all the resources they possess and thus leave no bequests. To 
facilitate the notation, after-tax interest rate will be defined as follows: 
 
    Rt = 1 + H1 - twtL rt       (3.4) 
 
By combining (3.3.1), (3.3.2), (3.3.3), and (3.4), this yields the individuals’ lifetime 
budget constraint:  
 
                                                 
12 In this study, retirees are assumed to totally opt out from labor force. Therefore, e3 is 
practically zero throughout simulation scenarios. 
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H1 + tc1 tL c1 t + H1 + tc2 t+1L c2 t+1Rt+1 + H1 + tc3 t+2L c3 t+2Rt+1 Rt+2 § Wt   (3.5)      
Wt = H1 - twtL e1 wt + H1 - twt+1L e2 wt+1Rt+1 + H1 - twt+2L e3 wt+2Rt+1 Rt+2  
 
 
C. Choices of Consumption-Saving: First-Order Condition  
This section requires special attention since the quasi-hyperbolic discounting involves 
complication arising from dynamic inconsistency in individuals’ intertemporal 
choices. Initially at period t, consider a new-born youth who maximizes his utility 
function (3.1) subject to his lifetime budget constraint (3.5). This can be shown as: 
 
  
u' Hc1 tL = B H1 + tc1 tLH1 + tc2 t+1L  gbRt+1F u' Hc2 t+1L    (3.6.1) 
 
u' Hc1 tL = B H1 + tc1 tLH1 + tc3 t+2L  gb2 Rt+1 Rt+2F u' Hc3 t+2L   (3.6.2) 
 
 
By adopting CES felicity function (3.2), (3.6.1) and (3.6.2) can be rewritten as: 
 
 
    
c2 t+1 = B H1 + tc1 tLH1 + tc2 t+1L  gbRt+1Fs c1 t      (3.7.1) 
   
    
c3 t+2 = B H1 + tc1 tLH1 + tc3 t+2L  gb2 Rt+1 Rt+2Fs c1 t     (3.7.2) 
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The consumption rules (3.7) are to be satisfied for the agent to obtain highest lifetime 
utility. Combining the lifetime budget constraint (3.5) and (3.7), one can derive 
optimal consumption level for a youth as follows: 
 





As a youth, the representative agent will allocate his consumption according to the 
consumption rule (3.8). With his current budget constraint (3.3.1), this implies the 
first-period saving s1t which will be taken to the next period. In period t+1 when the 
agent becomes adult, he will redo the optimization over his consumption choice given 
his endowed saving ts1 . By moving forward one period, the lifetime utility, the 
generation-wise budget constraints, and the lifetime budget constraint now become: 
 
     Ut+1 = u Hc2 t+1L + gbu Hc3 t+2L       (3.9)   
      H1 - twt+1L e2 wt+1 + Rt+1 sê1 t = H1 + tc2 t+1L c2 t+1 + s2 t+1   (3.10.1) 
 H1 - twt+2L e3 wt+2 + Rt+2 s2 t+1 = H1 + tc3 t+2L c3 t+2    (3.10.2)
   
Merging generation-wise budget constraints (3.10.1) and (3.10.2), the new lifetime 
budget constraint is as follows: 
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 H1 + tc2 t+1L c2 t+1 + H1 + tc3 t+2L c3 t+2Rt+2 § Wt+1  
          (3.11) 
Wt+1 = Rt+1 s1 t + H1 - twt+1L e2 wt+1 + H1 - twt+2L e3 wt+2Rt+2  
 
 
Maximizing the adult lifetime utility (3.9) subject to the new budget constraint (3.11) 
yields the new consumption rule to replace (3.6.2) and (3.7.2):  
 
 
u' Hc2 t+1L = B H1 + tc2 t+1LH1 + tc3 t+2L  gbRt+2F u' Hc3 t+2L    (3.12) 
 
Again, given the CES felicity function (3.2), (3.12) can be rewritten as: 
 
c3 t+2 = B H1 + tc2 t+1LH1 + tc3 t+2L  gbRt+2Fs c2 t+1     (3.13) 
 
 
By incorporating this consumption rule (3.13) to the adult’s lifetime budget constraint 
(3.11), one can determine optimal consumption for the adult as following: 
 
   
c2 t+1 = Wt+1A H1 + tc2 t+1L + H1+tc3 t+2LRt+2  I H1+tc2 t+1LH1+tc3 t+2L  gbRt+2MsE   (3.14) 
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this equation together with the consumption rule (3.13) then imply optimal 
consumption for the retirees c3t+2. In brief, the consumption-saving decisions of a 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting agent can be summarized by the set of first-order 
conditions: (3.8), (3.13), and (3.14).    
 
3.2) Firm Behavior   
The model has a single production sector which utilizes effective labor Lt and 
physical capital Kt to produce a composite good Yt. Physical capital is also assumed to 
be homogenous and depreciates at the rate δ, whereas labor differs only in its 
efficiency. That is, labor is perfectly substitutable and inelastic, but individuals of 
different generations supply different amounts of some standard measure of labor 
input −i.e., efficiency unit. This amount is the term ei (where i œ {1,2,3}) introduced in 
the last section. The production function assumes the form of Cobb-Douglas with 
exogenous technological progress. Formally, the production function and labor 
supply process can be shown as:  
 
Yt = AKta Lt1-a        (3.15) 
 
Lt = Nt e1 + Nt-1  e2 + Nt-2 e3      (3.16.1) 
 
Lt = He1 + e2 L N0        (3.16.2) 
 
where A denotes exogenous total factor productivity, α measures the share of capital 
income in the national output, Nt is the number of members in the new-born cohort. 
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With the assumption of constant population (Nt = N0) and that retirees do not supply 
labor, the labor supply in the economy is represented by (3.16.2).  
 Since the population base, 3N0, is arbitrary, it is convenient to express capital 
stock and output in a unit of per effective labor. Define capital stock per unit of 
effective labor as kt = Kt/Lt, and output per effective labor as yt = Yt/Lt. Then the 
production function can be shown as: 
 
  yt = Akta         (3.17) 
  
 Moreover, it is also posited that the production industry behaves competitively 
on both physical capital and labor markets. The profit-maximization conditions 
require the equality of the marginal productivity of each factor to its rate of return. 
They may thus be written in terms of an effective labor unit as: 
 
 wt = A  H1 - aL kta       (3.18) 
  
 rt = Aakta-1 - d        (3.19) 
  
where wt denotes the gross wage rate, rt represents the net interest rate, and δ is the 







3.3) Government Behavior  
It is assumed that a government maintains a balanced budget.13 To finance its 
spending, it can levy 1) income taxes (on both wage income and capital income of 
individuals) and 2) consumption taxes. Note that this study ignores the effects that the 
government spending has on agents’ behavior. In this fashion, one can think of 
government expenditures on, for example, a national defense. The government budget 
constraint per unit of effective labor can be written as: 
 
twt  yt + Htc 1 t N0  c1 t + tc2 t  N0 c2 t + tc 3 t  N0  c3 tLLt = gt  
     (3.20) 
 
where gt denotes government spending per unit of effective labor at period t. The first 
term of the government budget constraint (3.20) is the revenue from income taxation, 
whereas the second term is the revenue derived from consumption taxes. It is worth 
noting that tax rates levied on individuals’ consumptions can vary across generations, 
while those consumptions by individuals from the same age cohort face the identical 
tax rate.  Precisely, at time t, τc1t is the consumption tax rate for youths; τc2t for adults; 
and, τc3t for retirees.   
 
 
                                                 
13 This rules out the issue of the Ponzi game and the existence of public debts. Note, however, 
that though the government decides to issue public debts, the Ponzi game is still irrelevant in 
the context due to the finite number of population. For details, see Romer (2001), pp. 534-
535.   
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3.4) Dynamic General Equilibrium 
The dynamics of an economy is defined upon the evolution of the stock of physical 
capital over time. That is, the stock of physical capital at time t+1 is determined by 
the quantity of private assets accumulated by both youths and adults at time t (s1t and 
s2t, respectively): 
 
 Kt+1 = N0 s1 t + N0 s2 t       (3.21)  
 
where  s1 t = H1 - tw tL e1  wt - H1 + tc tL c1 t    (3.22.1) 
 
  s2 t = H1 - tw tL e2  wt + Rt s1 t-1 - H1 + tctL c2 t  (3.22.2) 
 
Also for convenience, the evolution of physical capital stock (3.21) can be written in 
terms of a unit per effective labor as following: 
 
 
kt+1 = HN0 s1 t + N0 s2 t LLt      (3.23) 
  
 Since an uncertainty is excluded from the model, the concept of equilibrium is 
that of perfect-foresight; the behavior of each sector in an economy must be 
consistent with the given current and future prices that clear all markets. In other 
words, in equilibrium, individuals’ consumption must be optimal by following the 
derived consumption rules. Firms must achieve profit-maximization by establishing 
the factor rates of return regarding to their productivity. The government must also 
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satisfy its budget constraint. Lastly, an economy must evolve according to the 
equation (3.23) which reflects the physical capital market clearance.   
 Briefly, the dynamic general equilibrium of an economy can be summarized 























Chapter 4: Simulation Methodology and Calibration 
 
 
The model outlined in Chapter 3 forms the basis for the calibration. This chapter 
examines the choice of parameter values and the simulation method that is used to 
solve for the general equilibrium. It also discusses some important characteristics of 
the benchmark steady states.  
 
4.1) Solution Method 
The general equilibrium described in the previous chapter involves a solution to the 
system of nonlinear difference equations. The solution is obtained numerically using 
an iterative technique referred to as the Gauss-Raphson method. This method requires 
all leads and lags to be transformed into a set of auxiliary variables. Then, the 
equations of the model will be stacked up period-by-period onto a large system of 
matrices. And the resulting system will be solved simultaneously by iteration. 
Basically, this procedure is done by employing the DYNARE sub-routine under 
MATLAB. 14 
 The simulation strategy typically proceeds in two stages: 1) simulating for 
benchmark steady states (for both exponential and hyperbolic cases) priori to the 
proposed change in tax policy, and 2) simulating for new steady states after that 
change takes effect. Note that the objective of this paper is to make a steady-state 
                                                 
14 The DYNARE sub-routine developed by CEPREMAP features the Gauss-Raphson engine which 
provides a user with a more accessible set of input expressions to solve models based on Rational 
Expectation. For details, see Juillard (1996).     
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comparison on welfare effect of income taxes and consumption taxes. The transitional 
dynamics of the policy shocks is beyond the scope of this study.           
 
4.2) Calibration  
The calibrated model yields the capital-labor ratios within the range of 10 to 20. The 
standard parameter values are based on the three-period OLG model with exponential 
discounting proposed in Docquier and Michel (1999) which bears the closest 
resemblance to the setup of this study. These are summarized in Table 4.1. It is worth 
noting that the chosen value of the standard discount factor (β = 0.82) implies that 
individuals weigh the current utility more than the utility derived in the next period by 
12%. Given that each period represents approximately 20 years, this corresponds to 
the annual discount factor of 0.99, which is close to the value used in Laibson (1996).     
Apparently, what remains to be determined is the choice of quasi-hyperbolic 
discount factor, γ. To this end, all simulation scenarios will be performed under the 
following values of γ : 1, 0.95, 0.9, 0.8, and 0.7. This covers the range mentioned in 
Laibson (1996, 1998) and Petersen (2004). 
Apart from the preference parameters, government spending is always 
assumed to be 15% of the national output throughout the simulation scenarios. 
Besides, otherwise specifically stated, the government’s default source of finance is 





4.3) Benchmark Steady States 
Given the parameter values, Table 4.2 shows the selected benchmark steady states as 
follows: 1) the exponential steady state where γ  = 1, 2) the quasi-hyperbolic steady 
state where γ  = 0.9, and 3) the quasi-hyperbolic steady state where γ  = 0.8.   
 It can be seen that the benchmark exponential steady state characterizes the 
front-loaded consumption path. This is due to the fact that the discount rate is greater 
than the interest rate in equilibrium.15 Therefore, individuals are relatively inclined to 
consume early in their lives, since instantaneous marginal benefit of consumption is 
greater than instantaneous marginal cost of consumption sacrificed to savings.         
 The impact of γ on the discount factors is shown in Figure 4.1. Though 
varying in the values of γ, each steady state shares the same value of the standard 
discount factor (β  = 0.82). Given the preference of individuals, Equation 3.1, the 
sequence of discount factors is {1, γβ, γβ2} corresponding to the period of youth, 
adult, and retiree, respectively. From this figure, one can observe that quasi-
hyperbolic discounting implies lower effective discount factors; i.e., individuals 
increasingly become more time-impatient. This result means that the consumption 
profile with quasi-hyperbolic discounting would become more front-loaded relative to 
the exponential case. Figure 4.2 shows the benchmark consumption profiles. Notice 
that, as compared to the exponential consumption path, the consumptions of 
hyperbolic individuals decline sharply in the period of retirement. Moreover, the 
                                                 
15 The discount rate is equal to [(1 – discount factor)/discount factor]*100. In the benchmark 
exponential case where β = 0.82 and γ = 1, the discount rate is 22%, whereas equilibrium interest rate 
is 18%.   
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magnitude of this decline is positively related to the degree of ‘hyperbolicness’ within 




























The choice of tax base is the central issue in the analysis of tax reform. It has 
important implications on many behavioral variables such as saving decision, labor 
supply decision, and etc. This issue has been analyzed by a number of studies based 
on a standard neoclassical framework.16 Given hyperbolic discounting, it therefore 
seems sensible to ask the following two questions: 1) is there any difference over the 
choice of tax base between the conventional case and the hyperbolic case? And 2) if 
such a difference exists, then how does that relate to the level of distortion imposed 
by hyperbolic discounting (i.e., the value of γ)? 
 This chapter considers these questions in relation to two tax regimes: income 
taxation and consumption taxation. By implementing a reform policy that switches 
the tax base from income (namely, wage and interest rate) to consumption, the 
analysis is founded on a comparison between the pre-reform and the post-reform 
steady-state results from the simulations.  
The structure of both types of taxes is assumed to be proportional. This means 
that, within any period, all individuals are facing the identical tax rates, regardless of 
the generation they are in (e.g., in the case of consumption taxation, τc1t  = τc2t+1  = 
τc3t+2).17 One can think of sale taxes, such as the Value-added Tax (VAT), as an 
example of this type of consumption taxation.   
                                                 
16 The literature in this area is led by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). This pioneer work provided a 
thorough analysis on fiscal policy within a standard general equilibrium framework including an 
extensive discussion of the issue of the optimal choice of tax base (i.e, tax reform policy).      
17 Note that, in steady states, the consumption-tax rates are time-invariant (i.e.,τct  = τct+j   for any j)     
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In line with the characteristics of the benchmark steady states provided in 
Chapter 4, the parameter values used in the simulations are taken from Table 4.1. 
Besides, the government maintains the balanced budget policy and therefore satisfies 
Equation 3.20. The government spending is assumed to be 15 % proportional to 
national output. This assumption allows different steady states to be comparable 
meaningfully to one another.   
Besides, it is worth noting that this study considers lifetime utility as the 
welfare criterion. The lifetime utility is obtained from Equation 3.1 by assigning the 
calculated steady-state value of each generation’s consumption.     
 
5.1) Pre-reform Results  
Table 5.1 compares various benchmark steady states under income taxation. The 
income tax rate, a default source to finance government spending, is endogenously 
computed to be at 15% in every benchmark steady state. These steady states share the 
same characteristics except only in their value of γ. The value of γ  reflects the degree 
of ‘hyperbolicness’; the smaller is γ, the higher degree of distortion imposed by 
hyperbolic discounting. 
Observe that, across steady states, capital stock, national output, and lifetime 
utility fall as γ  decreases. The reason for this is that hyperbolic discounting incurs 
undersaving among individuals. This is reflected by relatively lower level of savings 
of both youths and adults in hyperbolic steady states as compared to their exponential 
counterparts where γ  = 1. Besides, since lifetime utility is a function of 
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consumptions, which are in turn determined by lifetime income, decreasing national 
output therefore implies a lower level of lifetime utility subsequently.     
 
5.2) Tax Reform: A Switch to Consumption Taxation 
As mentioned earlier, this section considers implementation of a tax reform policy 
towards the consumption-tax regime. More specifically, given a constant proportion 
of government spending on national output, the income tax is fully replaced by the 
consumption tax as a source of revenue to finance its spending. Table 5.2 provides the 
results of the reform as an index relative to the pre-reform benchmarks (under income 
taxation). The results are presented in such a way that avoids a cross comparison 
among the steady states with different value of γ, for, to the author’s belief, it seems 
rather unjust to assess a policy under economies with individuals of ‘different’ 
characters.  
  In the post-reform steady states, the consumption tax is endogenously 
computed so that it generates the amount of revenue equal to 15% of national output. 
For example, the equilibrium consumption tax is 26.88% in the exponential case, 
whereas if γ = 0.9, the corresponding consumption tax is 25.99%.    
The consumer theory suggests that a removal of the income tax has an 
ambiguous effect on capital stock, since it depends on both substitution effect and 
income effect. On the one hand, a removal of the income tax means that individuals 
can enjoy higher return from their savings, thereby inducing greater incentive to save. 
On the other hand, this implies that the smaller saving is required over individuals’ 
lives to reach a nest egg of a given size, causing an adverse impact on saving.          
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However, the simulation results reveal that, in equilibrium, the substitution 
effect dominates the income effect and thus the overall effect on saving is clearly 
positive, with the increases of 18.10% and 22.81% in savings of youths and adults 
respectively in the exponential case. The similar results are observed in the 
hyperbolic cases: for instance, the increases of savings of youths and adults by 
17.89% and 23.03% (respectively) when γ  = 0.9, and by 17.46% and 23.49% when γ  
= 0.7 (respectively). 
Corresponding to the increases in individuals’ savings, a switch towards the 
consumption tax regime produces the higher level of the long-run capital stock, 
regardless of the values of γ . In the exponential case, the increase is 21.36% 
compared to the pre-reform value. When the hyperbolic steady states are considered, 
for instance, the increase is 21.49% when γ  = 0.9, whereas the increase is 21.80% 
when γ  = 0.7. The extent of the increase in the long-run capital stock found in this 
study is fairly close to those obtained by Petersen (2004) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff 
(1987).18   
As expected, in the standard exponential steady state, an imposition of the 
consumption tax generally suppresses consumptions: from Table 5.2, the 
consumption of youths is almost unchanged, while the consumption of both adults 
and retirees decreases markedly by 6.95% and 13.52%, respectively. This reduction 
in overall consumption leads to a drop in lifetime utility by 1.83% in the exponential 
case. However, the adverse welfare effect of the tax reform is not persistent. As the 
degree of distortion imposed by hyperbolic discounting increases (i.e., the value of 
                                                 
18 For Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), this is merely meant for the exponential case, since their study 
did not incorporate the hyperbolic discounting.    
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γ  becomes smaller), the consumption-tax regime gradually becomes relatively more 
favorable to individuals’ lifetime utility: when γ  = 0.9, the increase in lifetime utility 
is 0.09%; when γ  = 0.8, the increase is 0.93%; and when γ  = 0.7, the increase is 
1.36%.  
In terms of welfare implication, though the simulation shows that the tax 
reform induces positive outcomes on lifetime utility in the steady states with 
hyperbolic discounting, the overall welfare effect is relatively marginal.  
This finding is conforming with the results in Petersen (2004) in that 1) the tax 
reform towards the consumption-tax regime is welfare-improving in an economy with 
hyperbolic discounting, and 2) the extent on which the reform improves the level of 
welfare is positively related with the degree of hyperbolic discounting; i.e., the 
smaller is γ, the greater welfare-improving the reform would become.  
Though the results from both studies are broadly consistent, this study 
contradicts with Petersen (2004) in terms of magnitude. While Petersen (2004) 
reported the significant increases in lifetime utility (i.e., around 6%-7%), this study 
found the increases to be clustered around 1%. However, the disparity between these 
two results is probably caused by a difference in an assumption setup. Specifically, 
while this study assumes that government spending is always proportional to the size 
of an economy, Petersen (2004) adopts a constant amount of government spending 
across the simulation scenarios, in both pre-reform and post-reform steady states. 
Therefore, since the tax reform has an expansionary effect on long-run capital stock 
and national output, the post-reform government spending in this study becomes 
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comparatively larger than its pre-reform counterpart, entailing higher consumption-
















































This chapter analyzes the use of the consumption tax to restrain excessive 
consumptions induced by hyperbolic discounting. The analysis in this chapter 
consists of two sections. The first section provides a derivation of the proposed 
consumption-tax scheme and a discussion on its rationale. The second section 
presents supporting numerical evidences from the simulations.    
 
6.1) Derivation & Rationale 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the dynamically-inconsistent preferences elicited by 
hyperbolic discounting inflict the self-control problem on individuals’ saving decision 
process. Without a commitment technology, this results in front-loaded consumption 
paths that are sub-optimal. The Pareto improvement is therefore viable by restraining 
excessive consumptions in early lives of individuals. To this end, previous studies 
such as Laibson (1996) and Krussell et al. (2000) adopted capital-income taxes as an 
incentive-control device to deter early consumptions.  
 This study suggests the use of the consumption-tax scheme as a mechanism to 
rectify the dynamic inconsistency problem posed by hyperbolic discounting. 
Intuitively, the use of the proposed scheme will influence the relative prices of 
consumptions faced by individuals in such a way that negates the intertemporal 
distortion arising from hyperbolic discounting. As a result, consumptions by the early 
selves −i.e., youths’ consumptions, in this context− will entail higher tax surcharge 
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relative to consumptions by the later selves, thereby raising an incentive to save for 
future consumptions and thus neutralizing the distorted consumption path. 
 Thus, this study will propose the following: if individuals are hyperbolic 
discounting, and no commitment technology is in place (e.g., an illiquid asset or a 
designed saving plan), then the decreasing tax rates on consumptions, i.e., a higher 
tax rate for the younger generations, could improve welfare by bringing the 
intertemporal allocation of consumptions back to the optimal path. 
 This section will first revisit the individuals’ intertemporal allocation problem 
discussed in Chapter 3 and identify the equalities that represent the marginal rate of 
substitution (MRS) of individuals. Then, the exposition will proceed by presenting 
the three cases as follows: 1) the hyperbolic discounting case without the 
consumption taxes 2) the conventional case without the consumption taxes, and 3) the 
hyperbolic discounting case with the proposed consumption-tax scheme to rectify the 
intertemporal distortion.  
 
A. Intertemporal Allocation: First-order Conditions Revisited  
The setting of individuals’ preferences and budget constraints strictly follows what 
has been developed in Chapter 3. Note that the usual notations and descriptions of 
variables apply throughout this chapter.  
The representative individual’s intertemporal-choice problem is to maximize 
the lifetime utility, Equation 3.1, subject to the budget constraints, Equation 3.2, as 
follows:  
 




s.t.           H1 + tc1 tL c1 t + H1 + tc2 t+1L c2 t+1Rt+1 + H1 + tc3 t+2L c3 t+2Rt+1 Rt+2 § Wt  (3.5) 
 
where Wt = H1 - twtL e1 wt + H1 - twt+1L e2 wt+1Rt+1 + H1 - twt+2L e3 wt+2Rt+1 Rt+2  
 
Hence, at period t, the resulting first-order conditions are: 
 
u' Hc1 tL = l H1 + tc1 tL       (6.1.1) 
gbu' Hc2 t+1L = l H1 + tc2 t+1LRt+1      (6.1.2) 
gb2 u' Hc3 t+2L = l H1 + tc 3 t+2LRt+1 Rt+2      (6.1.3) 
   
where λ  denotes the intertemporal budget constraint multiplier. This set of the first-









u' Hc3 t+2L = bRt+2 ikjj H1 + tc2 t+1LH1 + tc3 t+2L y{zz   (6.2.2) 
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where MRSc1-c2 and MRSc2-c3  are the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumptions of the youth and consumptions of the adult and the marginal rate of 
substitution between consumptions of the adult and the retiree, respectively.     
However, it turns out that only the MRS of consumptions between the youth 
and the adult (6.2.1) is being realized de facto, whereas the MRS corresponding to the 
adult and the retiree (6.2.2) is hypothetical. This is because, in an absence of a 
commitment technology, hyperbolic discounting implies that individuals will re-
optimize their plan when they become adult, updating their optimal consumptions, 
c2t+1 and c3t+2 accordingly, at period t + 1. That is, the representative individual will 
face the new problem as follows:   
 
Maxci Ut+1 = u Hc2 t+1L + gbu Hc3 t+2L      (3.9) 
 
s.t. H1 + tc2 t+1L c2 t+1 + H1 + tc3 t+2L c3 t+2Rt+2 § Wt+1    (3.11) 
where Wt+1 = Rt+1 s1 t + H1 - twt+1L e2 wt+1 + H1 - twt+2L e3 wt+2Rt+2  
 
The first-order conditions then become: 
 
u' Hc2 t+1L = l H1 + tc2 t+1L      (6.3.1) 
gbu' Hc3 t+2L = lRt+2  H1 + tc 3 t+2L     (6.3.2) 
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which corresponds to the new MRS between consumptions of the adult and of the 
retiree, MRSc2-c3. Therefore, by replacing the hypothetical (6.2.2) with the updated 
MRSc2-c3, the set of effective MRSs, which is prevalent over individuals’ 




u' Hc2 t+1L = gbRt+1 ikjj H1 + tc1 tLH1 + tc2 t+1L y{zz   (6.2.1) 
MRSc2-c3 =
u' Hc2 t+1L
u' Hc3 t+2L = gbRt+2 ikjj H1 + tc2 t+1LH1 + tc3 t+2L y{zz   (6.4) 
 
B. The Consumption-tax Scheme: A Case Comparison     
 
Case 1: The Hyperbolic Discounting Case without the Consumption-tax Scheme  
With γ < 1, this implies that preferences of individuals are hyperbolic discounting. 
Therefore, this brings about the distorted intertemporal allocation which subsequently 
yields the anomalous front-loaded consumption paths that are sub-optimal. Without 
the consumption taxes (i.e., τc1t  = τc2t+1  = τc3t+2  = 0), the resulting MRS equalities 
are as follows: 
MRSc1-c2 =
u' Hc1 tL








Case 2: The Conventional Case without the Consumption-tax Scheme 
With γ = 1, the hyperbolic discount function degenerates to that of the standard 
exponential form, implying the optimal intertemporal allocation between 
consumptions and savings of individuals. As a benchmark, the consumption taxes are 
still assumed to be inaccessible in this case. From the derived set of the MRSs (6.2.1) 









u' Hc3 t+2L = bRt+2     (6.4)’’ 
 
Case 3: The Hyperbolic Case with the Consumption-tax Scheme 
With γ < 1, the allocation resembles that in Case 1, except that, however, the 
consumption taxes are imposed upon individuals in the following way: 
 H1 + tc1 tLH1 + tc2 t+1L = 1g        (6.5.1) 
   H1 + tc2 t+1LH1 + tc3 t+2L = 1g        (6.5.2) 
 
which can be equivalently expressed as: 
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  tc2 t+1 = g H1 + tc1 tL - 1       (6.5.1)’ 
 
tc3 t+2 = g H1 + tc2 t+1L - 1       (6.5.2)’ 
 
As can be seen from (6.2.1) and (6.4), the imposition of the consumption taxes 
as above will cancel out the term γ, which is the cause of the deviation from 
optimality. That is, this consumption-tax scheme helps remove the distortion on 
individuals’ intertemporal allocation and therefore force the anomalous MRS 
equalities under hyperbolic discounting ((6.2.1)’ and (6.4)’: Case 1) to conform with 
the optimal MRS equalities under standard exponential discounting ((6.2.1)’’ and 
(6.4)’’: Case 2).     
 Observe from (6.5.1)’ and (6.5.2)’ that this scheme implies the decreasing tax 
rate on consumptions of hyperbolic individuals, i.e., τc1t  > τc2t+1  > τc3t+2. When the 
steady state is attained, this inequality can be written as τc1t  > τc2t  > τc3t. This means 
that, within the same period, the youths face higher tax rate on consumptions than do 
the adults, while the adults also face higher tax rate than do the retirees. Put simply, 
the underlying idea is to levy higher tax rate on consumptions of the younger 
generations, restraining the consumptions in early lives of hyperbolic individuals.   
  
6.2) Simulation Results 
This section intends to present the numerical evidences in favor of the consumption-
tax scheme proposed in the previous section. The spirit of the simulation exercise in 
this section is to analyze whether this tax scheme could produce the positive welfare 
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effects on an economy where agents’ preferences are hyperbolic discounting. 
Essentially, this is done by comparing the simulated equilibrium that features the 
consumption-tax scheme to its benchmark counterpart, given that both equilibria are 
subject to hyperbolic discounting.   
 The framework of the simulation experiments performed here draws closely 
from Chapter 5. In words, the government maintains the balanced budget policy in 
accordance with Equation 3.20, to which its spending is exogenously assumed to be 
15 % proportional to the national output. In the benchmark equilibrium, all 
consumption taxes are inaccessible, and therefore τc1, τc2, and τc3 are all equal to zero, 
while an identical rate of the income tax, τw, is applicable to every generation. On the 
other hand, in the equilibrium with the consumption-tax scheme, the income-tax 
structure is analogous to that in the benchmark, except that the presence of 
consumption taxes now provides an additional source of revenue. 
More importantly, note that the basis of the simulations adopted here is to 
‘equalize’ the willingness to save between the two steady states: i.e., the one with the 
consumption-tax scheme and the one without it. In other words, both steady states are 
simulated to generate the same amount of the long-run capital accumulation. The 
benefit of this simulation strategy is that it helps determine the tax rate on the young 
cohort’s consumptions, τc1t.19  
                                                 
19 From Equation 6.5.1 and 6.5.2, it can be seen that the proposed consumption-tax scheme does not 
impose any constraint on the general level of the tax rate, which is set by τc1t. Thus, given the scheme 
itself, τc1t remains to be determined. The central idea of this scheme is simply to produce the relative 
tax rate that influences the intertemporal allocation.  
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 The simulations adopt the parameter values provided in Table 4.1. For the 
hyperbolic discount factor, γ , this section experiments with the two values, i.e., 
γ  = 0.9 and γ  = 0.8. The simulation results of the two scenarios corresponding to a 
different value of γ are separated by Table 6.1 (where γ  = 0.9) and Table 6.2 (where 
γ  = 0.8). These are accompanied by Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2, respectively, in which 
the consumption profile of each scenario is presented. 
 It has been shown in the previous section that the consumption-tax scheme 
exhibits the systematically-declining tax rate across the generation of individuals. 
Given the simulation basis of the capital-stock equivalence and the derived structure 
of the scheme (i.e., Equation 6.5.1 and 6.5.2), the value of the hyperbolic discount 
factor, γ , implies the exact tax rate on each generation’s consumptions: with γ = 0.9, 
τc1  = 10.15 %, τc2  = -0.87 %, and τc3 = -10.78 %; whereas, with γ = 0.8, τc1  = 30 %, 
τc2  = 4 %, and τc3 = -16.8 %. Note that the negative tax rate could be interpreted as 
the fringe benefit on consumptions granted by the government. 
 From the computed sequence of the consumption-tax rate, it can be seen that 
the degree of the ‘hyperbolicness’ is positively correlated to the level of the tax rate to 
be levied on individuals. In other words, with the smaller γ , it requires the higher tax 
rate to be imposed on consumptions. Given that γ = 0.9, the youths are subject to the 
10.15 % surcharge, while both the adults and the retirees are subsidized by 0.87 % 
and 10.78 % respectively in their consumptions. The level of the consumption taxes 
rises significantly as the hyperbolic discount factor becomes smaller; with γ = 0.8, the 
youths are subject to 30 % surcharge, while the adults now face 4 % surcharge. Note, 
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however, that this overall hike in consumption taxes also entails the greater amount 
that the government has to subsidize the retirees through consumptions; i.e., for the 
retirees, the corresponding subsidy rate is 16.8 %.         
Based on Table 6.1 and Table 6.2, the steady state with the consumption-tax 
scheme yields the values of capital stock, output, wage, interest rate, and government 
spending equal to those in the benchmark steady state. This is of course not surprising 
provided that the basis of the simulations is to generate the equivalent level of capital 
stock. Apart from these variables, however, it can be seen that the level of the income 
tax levied on individuals is different in the two steady states; the steady state with the 
consumption-tax scheme faces much lower income tax (e.g., Table 6.1: 9.89% as 
opposed to 15%; and Table 6.2: 3.21% as opposed to 15%). This difference in the rate 
of income taxes is present since the existence of the consumption taxes helps support 
the burden initially borne by the income tax alone to finance the government 
spending.                 
From the simulations, it is clear that the proposed consumption-tax scheme 
induces the higher overall level of the equilibrium consumptions. According to Table 
6.1, where γ  = 0.9, the increases are 2.55%, 8.41%, and 17.83% for the 
consumptions of the youth, the adult, and the retiree respectively, whereas from Table 
6.2, where γ  = 0.8, the corresponding increases are 2.34%, 11.26%, and 26.62%. The 
prime factor underlying this increment is a reduction in the income tax as a result 
from the implementation of the consumption-tax scheme. More specifically, by facing 
the lower rate of the income tax, individuals are left with the greater amount of the 
lifetime after-tax income, and therefore tend to spend more on consumptions.    
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As illustrated in Figure 6.1 and 6.2, the implementation of the consumption-
tax scheme not only raises the general level of consumptions, but also helps ‘smooth 
out’ the consumption paths chosen by hyperbolic individuals. Relative to the 
benchmark case, hyperbolic individuals who are subject to the scheme exhibit much 
less volatility in their consumptions across the life span.  
Besides, it is clear from both figures that the proposed scheme could 
effectively restrain the excessive consumptions in the early lives of hyperbolic 
individuals. The nature of the scheme that penalizes the consumptions in early lives (a 
tax surcharge) and indulges the consumptions in later lives (a subsidy) produces the 
effect of reversing the front-loaded consumption structure. Therefore, it can be seen 
that the resulting consumption paths− in both scenarios where γ  = 0.9 and γ  = 0.8− 
exhibit more inclination towards an end point of individuals’ lives, as compared to the 
benchmarks.  
In terms of the welfare effect, hyperbolic individuals are better off with the 
consumption-tax scheme.20 According to Table 6.1 and 6.2, the lifetime utility of 
those who are subject to the scheme is higher than its benchmark counterpart by 2.3 
% and 2.95 % respectively. Recalling the preference function, Equation 3.1, this 
welfare improvement is contributed by two factors, as a result of the scheme: 1) a 
higher overall level of consumptions and 2) a smoother consumption path. Besides, 
these results imply that the extent to which the scheme could improve welfare 
depends positively on the degree of the hyperbolic discount factor, i.e., the smaller 
the value of γ  is, the better the welfare improvement becomes.     
                                                 
20 Again, the welfare criterion is based on individuals’ lifetime utility (Equation 3.1). For details, see 
Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
 
This paper examines the properties of taxation when individuals possess hyperbolic 
discounting preferences and do not have an access to a commitment technology. 
Specifically, the following two issues are addressed. The first issue concerns a 
fundamental reform on tax regime from income taxation to consumption taxation. 
Based on the simulations, this reform experiment helps determining the proper choice 
of tax base in an economy with hyperbolic discounting. The analysis is founded on a 
comparison between the pre-reform steady state and post-reform steady state, given 
the varying degree of hyperbolic discounting. The second issue deals with the use of 
the consumption-tax scheme to restrain excessive consumptions by hyperbolic 
individuals. The formal derivation of the tax structure is presented together with the 
evidence from the simulations.   
In the analysis of a tax reform, the simulations suggest that a switch towards 
consumption taxation produces positive welfare effects when individuals are subject 
to hyperbolic discounting. That is, the extent of welfare improvement is positively 
correlated with the degree of hyperbolic discounting (equivalently, it is negatively 
correlated with the value of  γ), though the magnitude is somewhat negligible; when 
γ  = 1 (exponential discounting), the welfare gain is -1.83%; when γ  = 0.9, the 
welfare gain is 0.09%; when γ  = 0.8, the gain is 0.93%; and when γ  = 0.7, the gain is 
1.36%. What accounts for these lukewarm results may be that, though the shifting 
towards consumption taxation helps deter consumptions and thus should contribute to 
welfare improvement in the hyperbolic cases, intertemporal distortions among 
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individuals are not structurally removed given the flat-rate structure of the 
consumption-tax regime (i.e., every individual faces the identical tax rate, regardless 
of her generation).  
 Hyperbolic individuals lack self-control over instantaneous gratification; as 
consumers, they are susceptible to a consumption spree in their earlier lives and are 
eventually forced to ‘squeeze through’ with their limited savings when they move to 
elder generations. Given this insight, casual observation suggests that individuals 
from different generations should not be imposed the same tax rate on their 
consumptions. Rather, the proper tax structure should be of a declining pattern; i.e., 
discouraging the youths from overspending, while keeping a more lenient stance 
towards the retirees who are, supposedly, short of savings. This paper formalizes this 
argument by deriving the explicit consumption-tax structure that is dependent on the 
hyperbolic discounting parameter, γ.          
 The numerical evidence is in favor of the proposed consumption-tax scheme. 
From the simulations, the implementation of the scheme induces more consumption 
smoothing among hyperbolic individuals, provided the identical set of parameter 
values. This corresponds to the improving welfare outcomes: when γ  = 0.9, the 
corresponding tax rates for youths, adults, and retirees are 10.15%, -0.87%, and -
10.78% respectively and the welfare gain is 2.3%; and when γ  = 0.8, the 
corresponding rates for youths, adults, and retirees are 30%, 4%, and -16.8% 
respectively and the welfare gain is 2.95%. The negative tax rates (i.e., a subsidy on 
consumptions) experienced in elder generations are merely a transfer of resources 
from the younger generations within the same period, since the government is 
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assumed to maintain balanced budget policy and thus use revenue from consumption 
taxation to finance the subsidy.   
 In reality, there are other compelling reasons for taxation than helping 
individual consumers deal with their undersaving problem. This paper omits from 
modeling those other reasons. Besides, the issue of policy implementation in practice 
remains to be a challenge; it is hard to imagine that the market would be able to single 
out the specific tax rate to each consumer and effectively discriminate the prices (e.g, 
one good, three price tags?). This would incur a huge menu cost and the resulting 
problem of deciding which party is going to bear this cost.  
 The main caveat of this paper is the compactness of the specification. 
Admittedly, the model abstracts from many important facets of economies. There is 
ample space for extending this work further into more realistic scenarios. One 
possibility is to generalize the consumers beyond the three-period lived setting. 
Another is to introduce more variety of taxation policies that are more sophisticated 
in structure. All in all, the results and implications from this paper should be seen as 
providing supporting arguments towards the structure of taxation when an economy is 
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    Parameter Description Value 
Α total factor productivity 30 
α capital income share 0.3 
e1 human capital: youth 1 
e2 human capital: adult 1 
e3 human capital: retiree 0 
δ depreciation 1 
σ elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0.65 
β standard discount factor 0.82 














Appendix A (cont.) 
 
Endogenous 
Variable γ = 1(exponential) γ = 0.9 γ = 0.8 
capital stock* 18.29 16.59 14.79 
output* 71.74 69.67 67.31 
annual interest rate 
(%) 0.82 1.16 1.57  
interest rate (%) 18 26 37 
wage rate 50.22 48.77 47.12 
government 
spending* 10.76 10.45 10.10 
income-tax rate (%) 15 15 15 
consumption: youth 31.45 31.51 31.46 
consumption: adult 30.28 30.36 30.34 
consumption: retiree 29.15 28.37 27.50 
saving: young 11.24 9.94 8.59 
saving: adult 25.34 23.24 20.98 
lifetime utility 8.51 7.99 7.47 
Table 4.2:  Benchmark steady states                                                  
























γ = 0.95 γ = 0.9 γ = 0.8  γ = 0.7 
inc. tax rate (%) 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 
capital stock* 18.29 17.45 16.59 14.79 12.89 
output* 71.74 70.74 69.67 67.31 64.59 
interest rate (%) 18 22 26 37 50 
wage 50.22 49.52 48.77 47.12 45.21 
gov. spending* 10.76 10.61 10.45 10.10 9.69 
consumption: 
youth 31.45 31.49 31.51 31.46 31.22 
consumption: 
adult 30.28 30.33 30.36 30.34 30.16 
consumption: 
retiree 29.15 28.77 28.37 27.50 26.51 
saving: youth 11.24 10.60 9.94 8.59 7.21 
saving: adult 25.34 24.31 23.24 20.98 18.56 
lifetime utility 8.51 8.25 7.99 7.47 6.94 
Table 5.1:  Pre-reform benchmark steady states under income taxation (actual values)                          





































inc. tax  (%-actual) 15 0 15 0 15 0 15 0 15 0 
cons. tax (%-actual) 0 26.88 0 26.44 0 25.99 0 25.08 0 24.15 
capital stock 100 121.36 100 121.42 100 121.49 100 121.63 100 121.80 
output 100 105.98 100 106.00 100 106.01 100 106.05 100 106.09 
interest rate 100 83.30 100 71.49 100 61.71 100 47.84 100 38.49 
wage 100 84.36 100 106.00 100 106.01 100 106.05 100 106.09 
gov. spending 100 105.98 100 106.00 100 106.01 100 106.05 100 106.09 
consumption: youth 100 100.12 100 100.31 100 100.70 100 101.30 100 102.44 
consumption: adult 100 93.05 100 97.57 100 98.41 100 102.89 100 104.45 
consumption: retiree 100 86.48 100 94.97 100 102.03 100 107.35 100 110.08 
saving: youth 100 118.10 100 117.99 100 117.89 100 117.67 100 117.46 
saving: adult 100 122.81 100 122.92 100 123.03 100 123.25 100 123.49 
lifetime utility 100 98.17 100 99.36 100 100.09 100 100.93 100 101.36 
 















income tax (%) 15 9.89 100 66.67 
capital stock* 16.59 16.59 100 100 
output* 69.67 69.67 100 100 
interest rate (%) 26 26 100 100 
wage rate 48.77 48.77 100 100 
government spending* 10.45 10.45 100 100 
consumption: youth 31.51 32.32 100 102.55 
consumption: adult 30.36 32.91 100 108.41 
consumption: retiree 28.37 33.43 100 117.83 
saving: young 9.94 10.05 100 101.11 
saving: adult 23.24 23.13 100 99.53 
lifetime utility 7.99 8.18 100 102.30 
Table 6.1: Effects of the proposed consumption-tax scheme (γ = 0.9) 





Actual Value Index Value (base = 100)   Endogenous 








income tax (%) 15% 3.21% 100 21.4 
capital stock* 14.79 14.79 100 100 
output* 67.31 67.31 100 100 
interest rate (%) 37 37 100 100 
wage rate 47.12 47.12 100 100 
government spending* 10.10 10.10 100 100 
consumption: youth 31.46 32.19 100 102.34 
consumption: adult 30.34 33.75 100 111.26 
consumption: retiree 27.50 34.82 100 126.62 
saving: young 8.59 8.87 100 103.26 
saving: adult 20.98 20.7 100 98.66 
lifetime utility 7.47 7.69 100 102.95 
Table 6.2: Effects of the proposed consumption-tax scheme (γ = 0.8) 















Figure 4.2:  Benchmark consumption profile for various values of  γ  
  64










Figure 6.1: Consumption-tax scheme:  the steady-state consumption profiles (γ  = 0.8) 
 
